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Essay
Godel and Langdell-A Reply to Brown








Law scavenges. This fact is widely known. Law borrows from phi-
losophy, from economics, from literary theory, from theology-from
anything useful. The so-called "Law and " disciplines, in
which the blank is filled in by almost any word that could describe an
undergraduate major in the humanities or social sciences, quintessen-
tially reflect this borrowing. In the words of Kathryn Abrams,
Legal scholars are natural scavengers. Perhaps law lies at the in-
tersection of many bodies of human understanding, or perhaps the four
walls of legal doctrine make for a particularly narrow space. But we
can rarely resist the urge to prowl the terrain of another discipline, and
haul its juiciest morsels back to our lair.2
Law scavenges usefully from things that law is like.
Because I identify with both the Law and Literature and Law and
Religion movements, my own academic house has enough glass to make
me wary of throwing stones. Nevertheless, I argue in this Essay that the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.A. 1981, Rice
University; M.A. 1982, J.D. 1985, Yale University. I thank Seth Chandler, Jim Herget, Craig
Smyser, and Maryanne Lyons for their helpful suggestions. I am also grateful to Leslie
Winaker and her staff, and to the University of Houston Law Foundation for financial support.
1. 1 C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS at vii
(Boston, Little, Brown 1871).
2. Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1591 (1988).
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utility of scavenging has definite limits, and that in certain respects legal
theory has overstepped them. My point of departure is the article writ-
ten by Mark R. Brown and Andrew C. Greenberg that recently appeared
in this Journal. 3 In it, Brown and Greenberg purport to prove for law
what Kurt Gddel proved for mathematics. G6del's proof, which I sum-
marize below in Part I, represents "one of the most important advances
in logic in modem times."' 4 G6del's revolutionary paper reached "the
astonishing and melancholy conclusion that the axiomatic method,"
which accepts without proof certain propositions as axioms and then de-
rives all other propositions (as theorems) from those axioms, has certain
"inherent limitations. '"
Gbdel was a mathematician, and his proof, while having ramifica-
tions beyond mathematics, is fundamentally a mathematical achieve-
ment. Christopher Columbus Langdell epitomizes the now-discredited
scientific approach to legal analysis and jurisprudence. More than any
other American legal figure, Langdell conjures up the image of the law-
yer as scientist, reasoning axiomatically, accepting certain propositions
as true and thence deriving all others. For Langdell, law could be stud-
ied and comprehended entirely from within, just as geometry can be.
But Langdell was wrong, of course. Beginning with the Realist as-
sault on Langdell's citadel, generations of legal theorists have shown that
even the elementary legal principles are infinitely malleable and con-
stantly changing, unlike scientific or mathematical axioms. G6del, on
the other hand, was right, and his famous proof dealt a heavy blow to the
way of thinking on which Langdell relied. Yet, despite these superficial
differences, there is a profound sense in which G6del and Langdell evoke
the same image, for what G6del proved is that axiomatic systems have
inherent limits-not that axiomatic systems are fundamentally inapt.
Had it not been for the Realists and their followers, Langdell could
surely have assimilated G6del's insight, just as modem physicists and
computer scientists have done. This move is exactly what the recent
scavengers of G6del's proof seem to have in mind; they use G6del not to
continue the Realist critique, but to thwart it. Their invocation of Gbdel
is a return to Langdell.
3. Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439
(1992). Mark Brown, a law professor, has an undergraduate degree in mathematics. Andrew
Greenberg is a law student and a graduate student in computer science.
4. ERNEST NAGEL & JAMES R. NEWMAN, G6DEL'S PROOF 3 (1958).
5. Id. at 6.
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Brown and Greenberg may be the most recent contenders for Lang-
dell's mantle, but they are by no means the only contenders. In fact, in
the last seven years, no fewer than nine articles in major law reviews have
cited or discussed Giidel's Incompleteness Theorems. 6 In the last three
years, at least four major articles have addressed whether G5del's Theo-
rem can be applied to law, and toward what conclusion. 7 In 1992 alone,
two articles-one in addition to Brown and Greenberg's--explicitly ar-
gue that G6del's result applies to the law.8 Ironically, however, the au-
thors of these two articles put their conclusions to dramatically different
uses.
On one hand, John Rogers and Robert Molzon maintain that the
applicability of Gbdel's Theorem to our legal system renders the claims
of indeterminacy theorists, and particularly those of the Critical Legal
Studies (CLS) scholars, uninteresting if not pass6. They assert:
Gidel's theorem strongly suggests that it is impossible to create a legal
system that is "complete" in the sense that there is a derivable rule for
every fact situation. It follows that criticisms of constitutional systems
for failure to determine every answer are unfair: they demand more
than any legal system can give. At best they are antilegal in the sense
6. See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 3; Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy,
85 Nw. U. L. REv. 148, 172-76 (1990) [hereinafter D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy];
Anthony D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L.
REv. 561, 597 (1989) [hereinafter D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain?]; Rudolph J. Peritz,
Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of Business Records Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 80 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 956, 999 (1986); John M. Rogers & Robert E.
Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law From Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90
MICH. L. Rnv. 992 (1992); M.B.W. Sinclair, Notes Toward a Formal Model of Common Law,
62 IND. L.J. 355, 363 n.33 (1987); Girardeau A. Spann, Secret Rights, 71 MINN. L. REv. 669,
698-99 n.58 (1987); John Stick, Can Nihilism be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. Rnv. 332, 366
n. 146 (1986); Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the
Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 439 (1987). Many scholars have discussed
the consequences of the law's incompleteness without specifically referring to G6del's Theo-
rem. See, eg., Stuart Banner, Please Don't Read the Title, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 244, 253
(1989) (describing the world as "made up of an infinite number of loosely organized overlap-
ping systems"); George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1263
(1985) (exploring legal paradoxes and antinomies in an attempt to uncover underlying legal
premises); John T. Valauri, Confused Notions and Constitutional Theory, 12 N. KY. L. Rnv.
567 (1985) (examining Chaim Perlman's "confused notion" concept as an aid to understanding
constitutional theory); John Veilleux, Note, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEo. L.J. 1967
(1987) (evaluating and affirming the "scientific" approach to legal analysis).
7. See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 3; D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, supra
note 6, at 172-76; Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. Rv.
134, 143-45 (1990); Rogers & Molzon, supra note 6.
8. In the other article, John Rogers, a law professor, and Robert Molzon, a professor of
mathematics, set out to establish that any legal system must be incomplete in the same way
that axiomatic mathematical systems are incomplete. Insofar as this is the case, they argue,
one cannot persuasively attack the legal system-or any legal system-merely on the grounds
that it is incomplete. Rogers & Molzon, supra note 6, at 1016.
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that rejection of such constitutional systems on such a ground would
require the rejection of all constitutional systems.9
Accordingly, Rogers and Molzon dismiss the indeterminacy theorists'
critical insight as trivial. That our constitutional system contains un-
decidable propositions is not alone sufficient to indict the adequacy of the
system, they conclude, because any legal system will embrace the same
feature. 10
Brown and Greenberg, on the other hand, are less dismissive of
Critical Legal Studies, but their conclusion as to the applicability of
G6del's proof to law is no less categorical than Rogers and Molzon's.
Brown and Greenberg conclude that their legal version of "G5del's proof
... demonstrates that human insight is always necessary to resolve legal
disputes."" This claim hardly seems innovative; furthermore, although
it is not an endorsement of the Critical Legal Studies movement's polit-
ical agenda, this conclusion is in a sense an affirmation of the descriptive
component of the CLS critique. What the proponents of CLS decry as
the operation of pure political power,' 2 Brown and Greenberg call
insight.
I do not intend to quarrel with the descriptive conclusions of either
of these articles, for I share them. In my judgment, Rogers and Molzon
have dealt a serious blow to the philosophical foundation of CLS, though
I am not sure that any more blows were needed to demolish that shaky
edifice. ' 3 Similarly, Brown and Greenberg's endorsement of the necessity
of human insight coheres with my own view that what judges most need
in order to perform their function well is the quality of wisdom. 14 Never-
theless, the methodology of both pairs of writers-utilizing G6del's The-
orem to reach conclusions about the law-is seriously flawed. G6del
does less to illuminate than to obscure because analogies between law
9. Id. at 992.
10. Id. at 1016, 1021-22.
11. Brown & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 1485.
12. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1606 n.15
(1986) (arguing that legal interpretation is "part of the practice of political violence"); see also
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 55 (1983) (arguing that constitutional interpretation is driven by judicial
obedience to the political superiority of the state).
13. The philosophical destruction was complete with William Ewald's Unger's Philoso-
phy: A Critical Legal Study, 97 YALE L.J. 665 (1988). The assault on Unger began in earnest
with Anthony T. Kronman's Book Review, 61 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1976) (reviewing Ro-
BERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975)).
14. See David R. Dow, Hillel's Dilemma and Wisdom: The Paradigmatic Instance of the
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and the Judaic Resolution, 4 NAT'L JEWISH L. REV. 59
(1989); David R. Dow, Constitutional Midrash: The Rabbis' Solution to Professor Bickel's
Problem, 29 Hous. L. REV. 543 (1993) [hereinafter Dow, Constitutional Midrash].
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and mathematics (aside from the fact that such analogies are arcane in
the extreme) tend to perpetuate the canard that law is like science or
mathematics, when in fact it is not. What law is really like is religion-
something about which Gdel's Theorem has nothing to say.15
Gddel was a brilliant mathematician, and his work is critical to
many disciplines. It does not, however, aid legal discourse. Indeed, my
thesis is stronger still: To say that Gbdel's Theorem is useful to legal
discourse is to retreat from the Realists and return to the Langdellians.
I. Gbdel's Proof16
Decisions are reconciled which those who gave them meant to be op-
posed, and drawn together by subtle lines which never were dreamed
of before Mr. Langdell wrote.... Mr. Langdell's ideal in the law, the
end of all his striving, is the elegantiajuris, or logical integrity of the
system as a system. He is, perhaps, the greatest living legal theologian.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.17
Holmes was right to criticize Langdell, but he was wrong to charac-
terize him as a theologian. Contrary to Holmes's insinuation, religion
and theology are not logically pristine; nor do they aspire to be. 18 At
times, however, the scientist does resemble the theologian, and vice
versa. This is so not just because of the Talmudic and Scholastic tradi-
tions, which appear to share the methodological rigors of science, but
more importantly because of the air of certainty that emanates from both
scientific and theological discourse. Moreover, scientists can be deeply
religious, just as theologians can be great scientists. Albert Einstein was
15. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
16. G6del's proof appeared in German in 1931. See Kurt G6del, Uber formal
unentscheidbare Sdtze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I [On Formally
Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems 1], 38 MONATSHEFrE
FOR MATHEMATIK UND PHYSIK 173 (1931). An English version can be found in FROM
FREGE TO GoDEL: A SOURCE BOOK IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC, 1879-193 1, at 596, 596-616
(Jean van Heijenoort ed. & trans., 1967).
17. Book Notice, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 233-34 (1880) (reviewing LANGDELL, supra note 1
(2d ed. 1879)) (attributed to Holmes in MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS, 1870-1882, at 155-57 (1963)).
18. Cf David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of
Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 62-66 (1990) [hereinafter Dow, When Words Mean What We
Believe They Say] (discussing modem theologians' attempts to resolve various religious para-
doxes that ancient theologians were content to accept). My colleague Jim Herget has re-
minded me that many people would distinguish between religion and theology. I myself am
not sure that such a distinction is tenable. But if it is, I would say law is more like religion
than theology, for if theology is doctrine, religion is the body of actions that stems from that
doctrine. Because law governs conduct, it seems to me to be more like religion, whereas theol-
ogy is more analogous to jurisprudence. In any event, I do not find this dichotomy particu-
larly useful.
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quite religious early in his life,' 9 the theologian H. Scholz became a lead-
ing symbolic logician, 20 and Maimonides was a renowned physician.
2 1
Ludwig Wittgenstein, in fact, seems to have embodied scientific and reli-
gious impulses simultaneously. Bertrand Russell reported that
Wittgenstein
used to come to my rooms at midnight, and for hours he would walk
backward and forward like a caged tiger. On arrival, he would an-
nounce that when he left my rooms he would commit suicide. So, in
spite of getting sleepy, I did not like to turn him out. On one such
evening, after an hour or two of dead silence, I said to him, "Wittgen-
stein, are you thinking about logic or about your sins?" "Both," he
said, and then reverted to silence.
22
Godel, whom Wittgenstein knew, may or may not have been a deeply
religious man,2 3 but Gdel's work is surely not theological. Wittgenstein
unequivocally dismissed the philosophical significance of G6del's work;
24
his reaction to the use of G6del's proof in legal theory would almost
certainly have been, had he cared enough to react at all, one of
amazement.
G6del's Incompleteness Theorems state that formal mathematical
systems cannot be both complete and consistent. That is, G6del proved
"(1) that within any consistent formal system, there will be a sentence
that can neither be proved true nor proved false; and (2) that the consis-
tency of a formal system of arithmetic cannot be proved within that
system."
25
The term "Gbdel's proof" usually refers to his first incompleteness
theorem. It states that in any formal system of arithmetic (S), there will
be a sentence (G) of the language of S such that ifS is consistent, neither
19. HAO WANG, REFLECTIONS ON KURT G6DEL 73 (1987).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., ABRAHAM JOSHUA HSCHEL, MAIMONIDES 213-24 (1982).
22. BERTRAND RUSSELL, Some Philosophical Contacts, in PORTRAITS FROM MEMORY
AND OTHER ESSAYS 19, 23-24 (1956).
23. Compare WANG, supra note 19 (maintaining that G6del's personal religious beliefs
are unknown) with JOHN ALLEN PAULoS, BEYOND NUMERACY 97 (1991) ("Coming from a
Lutheran background, G6del wasn't conventionally religious, but always maintained his the-
ism and the possibility of a rational theology.").
24. A.J. AYER, WITTGENSTEIN 130 (1985).
25. RAY MONK, LUDWIG WiTTGENSTEIN: THE DUTY OF GENIUS 295 n.* (1990). Im-
portantly, as Professors Ernest Nagel and James Newman pointed out, Gddel's conclusion
does not rule out "the possibility of strictly finitistic proofs [of arithmetic's consistency] that
cannot be represented within arithmetic. But no one today appears to have a clear idea of
what a finitistic proof would be like that is not capable of formulation within arithmetic."
NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 98 n.3 1. A fine discussion of G6del and his work ap-
pears in WANG, supra note 19.
[Vol. 44HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
GODEL AND LANGDELL
G nor ~G 26 can be proved in S. In other words, and to oversimplify
slightly, Gddel established that there must be a sentence G of S that says
of itself, "I am not provable." From this theorem follows Gbdel's second
incompleteness theorem, which states that the consistency of a formal
system of arithmetic cannot be proved by any means that is formalizable
within that system.
27
Gddel constructed an arithmetical formula, G, that represents the
metamathematical statement "The formula 'G' is not demonstrable. '28
A metamathematical statement is a statement about-as distinguished
from of-the mathematical system. Thus, G says of itself that it is not
demonstrable. G6del also showed that G is demonstrable only if -G, its
formal negation, is also demonstrable. When a formula and its negation
are both formally demonstrable, however, the arithmetical calculus is not
consistent. Accordingly, if the calculus is consistent, neither G nor -G
is formally derivable from the axioms of arithmetic (S). Therefore, if
arithmetic is consistent, G is a formally undecidable formula. Gddel fur-
ther demonstrated that although G is not formally demonstrable, it is
nevertheless a true arithmetical formula.2 9 Roger Penrose has summa-
rized Gbdel's Theorem as follows:
Gddel showed... that any such precise ("formal") mathematical sys-
tem of axioms and rules of procedure whatever, provided that it is
broad enough to contain descriptions of simple arithmetical proposi-
tions.., and provided that it is free from contradiction, must contain
some statements which are neither provable nor disprovable by the
means allowed within the system.30
Understanding Gi5del's method, as well as the context in which he
developed his theory, aids in evaluating the significance of his work for
other disciplines. At the turn of the century, some thirty years before
Godel developed these theorems, the mathematician David Hilbert had
asked whether it could be proved that the axioms of arithmetic are con-
sistent-that is, whether the finite number of logical steps based upon
those axioms could ever lead to contradictory results. Some ten years
26. The logical symbol for negation, or "not," is the tilde: .
27. A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 133 (Antony Flew ed., rev. 2d ed. 1984); WANG,
supra note 19, at 273-81.
28. The summary that I offer in this paragraph borrows heavily from NAGEL & NEW-
MAN, supra note 4, at 85-86.
29. G is a true arithmetical formula in the sense that what G asserts in G6del's system is
that "every integer possesses a certain arithmetical property that can be exactly defined and is
exhibited by whatever integer is examined." Id. at 86.
30. ROGER PENROSE, THE EMPEROR'S NEW MIND: CONCERNING COMPUTERS,
MINDS, AND THE LAWS OF PHYSICS 102 (1989). For useful discussions of G~del's proof, see
id. at 105-08, 417-18, and DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, G6DEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL
GOLDEN BRAID 15-19, 261-72, 465-71, 696 (1979).
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after Hilbert posed the question, Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead
published the first volume of Principia Mathematica, which endeavored
to prove that all pure mathematics can be derived from a small number
of fundamental logical principles. The Principia failed in this quest; it
also did not answer Hilbert's question. G6del's Theorem addressed the
system described in the Principia.
31
G6del's system included constant signs (e.g., -, 0, +, A ) (these
characters are the vocabulary that is used to state the axioms from which
theorems are derived) and three types of variables: numerical variables,
sentential variables (i.e., formulas), and predicate variables (e.g., con-
cepts like >). G6del first assigned a number, called a G6del number, to
each character in the mathematical alphabet of constant signs (e.g., 1 to
-; 6 to 0; 5 to =; and so on). 32 G6del then assigned to each numerical
variable a prime number greater than ten; to each sentential variable the
square of a prime number greater than ten; and to each predicate variable
the cube of a prime number greater than ten. Each sign (or alphabetic
character), each formula (or sequence of characters), and each proof (or
sequence of formulas) has, G6del showed, a unique G6del number. The
G6del number for a string of mathematical characters is a function of the
string's constituent parts, and the system was constructed so that the
Gbdel number for each string is unique.
For example, 33 consider the following formula: (3x)(x = Sy).
This represents the statement "there is an x such that x is the immediate
successor of y; or, every number has an immediate successor." Each ele-
mentary sign in this formula has a G6del number. Thus,
( x ) ( x = Sy )
8 4 11 9 8 11 5 7 13 9
Because this formula contains ten elementary signs, its G6del number is
obtained by taking the product of the first ten primes in order of magni-
tude, each prime being raised to the power of the GiSdel number of the
corresponding elementary sign. Accordingly, the G6del number for the
formula is
28 X 34 X 511 X 79 X 11' X 13" X 175 X 197 X 2313 X 299 =
145,666,408,161,709,409,197,789,938,288,649,818,781,891,470,181,481,
887,898,950,349,321,995,516,094,737,500,000,000.
31. See CARL B. BOYER, A HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 655-56 (1968).
32. See NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 68-76; Brown & Greenberg, supra note 3, at
1550.
33. I borrow this example from NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 72-73.
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Once this system is set up, we can determine whether a given number is a
Gfdel number; if so, it can be associated with a distinct mathematical
expression.34 Because every statement within the calculus has a unique
Gddel number, Gbdel showed that every metamathematical statement
can be construed as a statement about the corresponding G6del numbers.
"This process of associating, or 'mapping,' strings within a system with
propositions about the system is known as 'embedding.' It is this tech-
nique, coupled with Gidel's intricate numbering scheme, that allowed
G6del to ultimately demonstrate the true existence of his G
proposition.
'35
It should be clear from this summary that G6del's proof is closely
tied to arithmetic; it can even be viewed as an answer to a particular
arithmetical question. 36 Consequently, the threshold step in applying
Gfdel's proof to other systems is to show that they either contain arith-
metic or comprise statements that correspond to arithmetic. More par-
ticularly, before Gdel's proof can be usefully analogized to law, two
critical tasks must be discharged. First, applying Gbdel's proof requires
enunciating all the legal rules that are "like" the rules of arithmetic; that
is, the law must be formalized. Though some theorists suppose this for-
malization is attainable, 37 and Brown and Greenberg assume it is feasi-
ble,38 no effort of which I am aware has come even remotely close to
accomplishing this feat.39 Second, a metalegal statement that is both true
and not logically provable within the confines of the system of legal rules
must be articulated. This second task is perhaps easier than the first,
although it is difficult to imagine what such a statement would look like.
In any event, without formalizing law, articulating such a metalegal
statement would not be terribly useful.
If the prospect of achieving these preconditions is chimerical, then
G~del's proof has little, if any, use in legal theory. I therefore argue in
the following Part that it is a mistake for legal theory to scavenge
mathematics.
34. For an example of how this is done, see id. at 76.
35. Brown & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 1469 (footnote omitted).
36. But see supra note 25.
37. See, ag., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
38. Brown & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 1462.
39. Cf. Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THE FATE OF LAW
160 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991) (criticizing the quest for formalization).
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II. Law and Conceptual Indeterminacy
It is difficult
to get the news from poems
yet men die miserably every day
for lack
of what is found there.
-William Carlos Williams4°
Law might be indeterminate for any of three reasons. The first is
that language, upon which law depends, is inherently vague. As a
consequence, legal propositions cannot be given a formal structure. This
school of thought, which is not unrelated to deconstructionism, is most
often associated with Stanley Fish and his followers. 41 Second, law
might be indeterminate even if it could be given a formal structure. This
is the argument made by those who endeavor to apply G6del's proof to
law. Finally, law might be indeterminate because there is no such thing
as "the law." We may call these three schools, respectively, linguistic
indeterminacy, formal indeterminacy, and conceptual indeterminacy.
The central difference between linguistic and conceptual indeterminacy is
that the former focuses on law's necessary dependence upon language
while the latter focuses on law's ontology (or, more precisely, ontologies).
It may be helpful to say a bit here about my idiosyncratic
pluralization of the word "ontology." In distinguishing among ontology,
epistemology, and causation, John Searle has observed that epistemology
answers the question "How do we find out about it?" and causation
answers the question "What does it do?", while ontology answers the
question "What is it?".42 Thus, when I speak of law's "ontologies," it
may appear that I am asking "What are law?"-an ungrammatical if not
incoherent question. My affinity for this pluralization, however, in a
sense encapsulizes my argument. For the answer to the question "What
is law?" is nothing. There is no such thing as law. There are discrete
legal doctrines. Each has its own ontology, yet even these discrete
ontologies cannot be apprehended apart from all the others. As W.V.
Quine has argued,
40. WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, Asphodel, That Greeny Flower, in JOURNEY TO LOVE
43, 56 (1955).
41. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989). Jim Herget has
pointed to language in Fish's writing that Herget reads as illustrative of Fish's affinity for what
I have called conceptual indeterminacy. Much of Fish's work can indeed be read to support
this characterization, but Fish's early writing, epitomized by his well known essay Is There a
Text in This Class?, unmistakably casts Fish as a linguistic indeterminist. See STANLEY FISH,
Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980).
42. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 18 (1992).
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there is no absolute position or velocity; there are just the relations of
coordinate systems to one another, and ultimately of things to one an-
other .... What makes sense is to say not what the objects of a theory
are, absolutely speaking,. but how one theory of objects is interpretable
or reinterpretable in another.
4 3
I argue that law is indeterminate because of conceptual indetermi-
nacy. Legal theorists like Holmes, as well as their critics, like the Crits, 44
have assumed the existence of a single, definable ontology called "the
law."' 45 This assumption is false. The very fact that law scavenges-that
law must scavenge-should alert us to the possibility that it has no iden-
tifiable ontology of its own. Linguistic and formal indeterminists do not
allow for this possibility. Formal indeterminists, moreover, like those
who rely on Gddel, are wont to talk of "the law" (as if there were such a
thing) in contending that consistency "is as essential to law as it is to
axiomatic systems." 46 Likewise, Brown and Greenberg acknowledge
that "the law has yet to achieve determinate formality" 47 before they
move on to assume that "legal English can support a formally con-
structed system."'48
The mistake that lurks behind the locution "the law" is the supposi-
tion that there is a single system, formal or otherwise, to which this ap-
pellation can be usefully applied. On the contrary, our legal system is
not analogous to G6del's mathematical system precisely because what we
call "the law" consists of entirely distinct ontological systems. These
various systems will themselves generate contrary results in particular
cases. This insight was, I think, among the Realists' central
contributions.49
43. W.V. QUINE, ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY 50 (1969).
44. I use "Crits" to refer to the scholars who view themselves as part of the Critical Legal
Studies movement. The label therefore lacks precision. I do not intend it to be pejorative.
45. Of course, Holmes rejected the idea that law is "a brooding omnipresence in the sky,"
but by this he meant no more than that law is made by humans. See Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
46. Rogers & Molzon, supra note 6, at 997; see id. at 999-1002 ("The law can thus be
considered as a system of consistent statements.").
47. Brown & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 1454.
48. Id. at 1462.
49. See, eg., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1241 (1931) (noting that attempts to define "law" ultimately
"converge to a single conclusion: there is less possibility of accurate prediction of what courts
will do than the traditional rules would le;7d us to suppose" (footnote omitted)); K.N. Llewellyn,
Legal Illusion, 31 COLUM. L. Rv. 82 (1931); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-
The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 431 (1930) ("The difficulty in framing any concept of
'law' is that there are so many things to be included, and the things to be included are so
unbelievably different from each other.").
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When G6del established the truth of G, he was establishing the truth
of a descriptive metamathematical proposition. 50 No normative legal
statement, however, is analogous to G. In fact, the "true" overarching
legal principle-the analogue to Gbdel's formula G-is precisely what is
the subject of dispute in normative legal discourse. G has no analogue in
law.
Unlike mathematics, law is conceptually indeterminate (as opposed
to formally indeterminate) because legal propositions develop as answers
to questions rather than as mere propositions. The mathematical propo-
sition "every number x has a successor" is true, and its truth is independ-
ent of its utility as an answer to a question. That is not the case with
legal propositions. Pure mathematics does not exist solely to answer our
questions; law, however, exists to mediate disputes. Law mediates be-
tween the real and the ideal-a distinction that is foreign to mathematics.
Law resolves disputes, and those disputes typically call for a simple "yes"
(X) or "no" (-X) answer.51
Many disputes can obviously be answered either X or -X. The im-
portant question, however, is: What are we to make of this? The answer
to this question depends, finally, on which type of indeterminists one
asks. The linguistic indeterminists argue that the possibility of deriving
either X or -X results from law's use of language, which, they say, is
inherently vague. They conclude, then, that the root of this phenomenon
is linguistic. The formal indeterminists, on the other hand, argue that
the possibility of answering a certain question either X or -X is trivial in
view of the indeterminacy of all formal systems. They conclude that this
phenomenon is inherent. The conceptual indeterminist agrees with the
formal indeterminist that the possibility of deriving either X or -X is
uninteresting yet, unlike both the linguistic and formal indeterminists,
further holds that this possibility exists because the idea of "the law" is
an illusion. 52 The linguistic indeterminist blames not law but language;
the formal indeterminist blames not language but law; the conceptual
indeterminist says there is nothing to blame. "The law" does not exist.
50. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
51. More accurately, legal disputes typically call for a series of "yes" or "no" answers,
though this observation does not affect my argument. Further, as Seth Chandler has reminded
me, many issues, including assessment of damages and comparative fault determinations, do
not easily satisfy this description. Although even these issues can be reduced to a series of
binary questions, that reduction might be misleading. The present point is simply that one
should perhaps emphasize the word "typically" in the text.
52. Although Jack Balkin has used the term "conceptual opposition," he does not use it
as I do in this Essay, and his views generally are more amenable to what I characterize as




Law comprises distinctive sets of norms, entirely discrete normative
regimes.53 In the following discussion, I illustrate this notion of concep-
tual indeterminacy with two examples, both taken from the work of
those who argue in favor of G6del's relevance to legal theory. Consider
first a problem of contract law, like the one Brown and Greenberg con-
struct. (Q): Is the defendant, Langdelle (L), liable to the plaintiff,
Gurdelle (G), for breach of contract?54 Answering this so-called ultimate
legal question requires that we resolve a threshold inquiry, namely (Ql):
Do L and G have a contractual relationship?55 Let X represent the state-
ment: "Yes, there is a contractual relationship between L and G," and
let -X represent the contrary conclusion. Contract doctrine ("contract
law") establishes that we can recast (Ql) into three questions. (QIA):
Did L make an offer? (QlB): Did G accept? And (QlC): Was there
consideration? If and only if the answers to each of these three questions
is affirmative is the answer to (Ql) affirmative.
56
Now consider several factual assumptions. Assume that (Al): L
and G had a single conversation; at the time of their conversation, both L
and G believed that L's statement to G was an offer; and both L and G
believed that G's response constituted an acceptance. 57 Let us also sup-
pose, however, that (A2): no reasonable person in G's position would
have believed that L's statement was an offer. Finally, if we assume that
no other facts are germane, then the answer to the threshold question (Is
there a contractual relationship?) will be the same as the answer to the
ultimate legal question (Is L liable to G?).
We can answer this ultimate question either X or -X. The answer
is indeterminate because there is no such thing as "contract law." Con-
tract law instead comprises distinctive approaches to answering the sali-
ent questions. These approaches reflect disjoint normative ontologies,
and it is precisely the choice of approach that determines the outcome.
Furthermore, and contrary to Brown and Greenberg's view, these dis-
tinctive approaches cannot plausibly be treated as residing in a single
53. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CmI. L. Rav. 1057, 1060 (1990) (arguing that judges should define unenumerated
constitutional rights through interpolation and extrapolation from the enumerated rights-a
process that must be guided by normative regimes "at least partially external to the constitu-
tional text").
54. See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 1477-80.
55. Assume further that this question is the sole relevant one, for it is conceded that if
such a relationship exists, L is in breach and must pay damages to G. Brown and Greenberg,
on the other hand, proceed by assuming the existence of the relationship and focusing on
whether G performed. Id. at 1477.
56. I have oversimplified classical contract doctrine in order to facilitate the analysis.
57. Let us suppose that the issue of consideration is not in dispute.
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legal system; in a compelling sense, they represent entirely discrete, com-
peting systems.5 8 Thus, if we apply the so-called "will theory" to our
problem-focusing solely on what the parties believed at the moment of
asserted contract formation-then by hypothesis we generate X; we do so
by viewing (A1), and only (A1), as relevant to the determination of (Ql).
This choice of approach would reflect a normative conclusion that the
parties' intent is dispositive of questions of contract formation.5 9
On the other hand, if we apply a different theory, in this case the
objective theory of contract, then only (A2) is germane, and we thereby
generate -X. 60 The fact that we can derive either X or -X does not
show that the system is incomplete; this analysis discloses that "contract
law" is ambiguous because it can refer to either of two systems in this
instance. The central problem facing legal theory is the absence of a nor-
mative structure that directs us to one system or the other. Or, stated
differently, law does not include a true statement G-an overarching
legal principle from which it logically follows that we should use either
(Al) or (A2) in analyzing (Q1).
A similar example can be laid out in the constitutional context. For
instance, Rogers and Molzon use United States v. Nixon 61 as an illustra-
tion of formal indeterminacy.62 The ultimate legal question presented in
the Nixon case was (Ql): Is the President constitutionally obligated to
comply with a court-ordered subpoena duces tecum directing him,
against a claim of privilege, to produce certain tapes and documents?
Rogers and Molzon point out that additional questions, analogous to dif-
ferent levels of generality, might arise infinitely. Thus, (Q2): Who gets
to decide (Q 1)? And (Q3): Who gets to decide (Q2)? And so on.
The second question, however, as Rogers and Molzon remind us,
was answered in Marbury v. Madison.63 Furthermore, the answer given
58. Peculiarly, both these legal systems reside in a single culture. Because of coexistent
contradictions like this, theorists enamored with consistency periodically endeavor to harmo-
nize the competing systems. See Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say, supra
note 18, at 66 ("We can see paradox, but no amount of thinking can resolve it.").
59. For a typical debate on the normative centrality of intent to modem contract doc-
trine, compare David R. Dow, Law School Feminist Chic and Respect for Persons: Comments
on Contract Theory and Feminism in The Flesh-Colored Band Aid, 28 Hous. L. REV. 819,
822-31 (1991) [hereinafter Dow, Law School Feminist Chic], with Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter
Linzer, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid-Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and Norms, 28 Hous.
L. REV. 791 (1991), and Peter Linzer, Is Consent the Essence of Contract?-Replying to Four
Critics, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 213, 217-20.
60. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6 (2d ed. 1990) (describing
subjective and objective theories of assent).
61. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
62. Rogers & Molzon, supra note 6, at 1003-05.
63. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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in Marbury put a firm halt to the inlinite regress. No one can plausibly
gainsay that Chief Justice Marshall could have answered the issues raised
by that case differently at any number of steps along the way. 64 Focusing
on that truism, however, as Rogers and Molzon do, obscures the serious
issue and elides the heart of the difficulty. The central theoretical prob-
lem is that even once we agree with Chief Justice Marshall's answer to
(Q2), the problem remains: How should (Q1) be analyzed? Stated with
only some hyperbole, the interpretivist's answer to this question is analo-
gous to the will theorist's answer to our contract problem, while the
noninterpretivist's answer is akin to the objectivist's model.65 We have
neither agreement concerning the appropriate methodology nor a way to
demonstrate that one and only one method is acceptable. Contrary to
Rogers and Molzon's suggestion, the problem is not that "the system"
can answer the ultimate legal question both "yes" and "no" (i.e., X and
-X); the problem is that the contradictory answers flow from disjoint
methodological approaches-and legal theorists are making little pro-
gress in formulating a rule that instructs us how to choose in a given case
from among the competing methods.
Like Rogers and Molzon and the formal indeterminacy theorists in
gejieral, Brown and Greenberg overlook the phenomenon of conceptual
indeterminacy because they confuse normative with descriptive proposi-
tions. Normative propositions have no place in Gidel's world. Legal
theory, in contrast, includes both types of propositions, and care must be
taken not to confuse them. Whereas linguistic indeterminists err by dis-
missing the possibility of agreement on legal norms, 66 formal indetermin-
ists go awry by failing to recognize that legal norms exist. At times our
normative discourse, within law and without, may look like science, but
in truth it is more like theology. 67
64. See generally William N. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DUKE L.J. 1 (describing the various possible approaches that Marshall might have used to
decide Marbury).
65. On the interpretivist-noninterpretivist nomenclature, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); a parallel morphology, using
"originalism" and "nonoriginalism," can be found in Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 204 n.l. (1980). Cf Michael J. Perry, The
Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 669
(1991) (noting that Ely's distinction is defunct and Brest's is dominant).
66. Cf. Dow, Law School Feminist Chic, supra note 59, at 832-33 (arguing that normative
agreement is possible).
67. Like religion, law includes theorems derived from axioms, but those axioms (though
they may indeed change over time) purport to be beyond challenge; they rest on a type of faith.
Further, while it is true that even mathematical or scientific truisms might reflect our (the
experimenter's or the observer's) relationship to the physical world, the "our" in the preceding
clause refers to all of humankind. Religious and legal truisms, on the contrary, reflect nothing
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Brown and Greenberg simply do not recognize this truth. They
state, for example, that G6del's proof "means . . . that law . . . must
contain an infinite number of undecidable propositions. ' 68 They over-
look the reality that law simply answers questions of a given culture.
Brown and Greenberg then criticize "mainstream [legal] scholarship" for
arguing normatively about these answers and teaching that "the vast ma-
jority of disputes have singular, determinate answers."' 69 Yet, as we have
seen, most disputes do have a single answer-once we choose the pre-
ferred analytical method. 70 Notably, Brown and Greenberg single out
for criticism the work of Richard Posner, Donald Regan, Rolf Sartorius,
and Frederick Schauer-a rather diverse lot. What all their work has in
common, say Brown and Greenberg, is that it surreptitiously embodies
determinacy. 71 Undoubtedly these writers (and many others) have com-
plained that some cases are "wrongly" decided, but the very essence of
this criticism is normative: It frequently signifies disagreement with the
method used to generate an answer in a particular case. Brown and
Greenberg do not grasp this point. Hence, they say:
Any accurate description of the American legal system must recognize
that the law has yet to achieve determinate formality. This acknowl-
edgement, however, does not answer the normative question of whether
the law can operate in a determinate, formal fashion. Perhaps these
imperfections in the law can be corrected. Maybe the current indeter-
minacy in the law is only contingent; practical difficulties such as im-
precise drafting, miscommunication, or even simple human error may
be the causes. Controlling for these practical contingencies, the question
then is the normative one of whether the law-in theory-can be ideally
formalized.
72
The question of whether the law is formalizable, however, is not a norma-
tive question. Brown and Greenberg have confused the question of
whether something is possible with the question of whether it is right.
73
more than the views of a temporally delimited culture. For my own views on the similarity
between religious and legal discourse (and the concomitant usefulness of religion for legal
scavengers), see Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say, supra note 18, at 1-29,
62-66, and Dow, Constitutional Midrash, supra note 14.
68. Brown & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 1444.
69. Id. at 1450.
70. This point is central to much of Professor Frederick Schauer's jurisprudential writ-
ings. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985).
71. See id. at 1450 n.65 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE 41 (1990), Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1091 (1986), Rolf Sartorius, Bayes'
Theorem, Hard Cases, and Judicial Discretion, 11 GA. L. REV. 1269, 1269 (1977), and Freder-
ick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 546 (1988)).
72. Id. at 1454 (emphases added).
73. Brown and Greenberg also confuse the idea of subjectivity with that of vagueness and
assume these two ideas to be one. See id. at 1457-58. They conclude that human insight is
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Dennis Lloyd pointed out a generation ago that "[l]egal rules are norms
of conduct which are in themselves neither true nor false."'74 Law is
rended by conceptual indeterminacy because we use these rules to resolve
individual cases, and the particular rules that we utilize vary according to
what meta-goals we believe law is to further.
Conclusion
That with which people most continuously associate-the dis-
course that orders everything-with this they are at variance; and
what they encounter every day seems strange to them.
Although the discourse is shared, most people live as if they had a
private understanding.
The person who speaks with understanding must insist upon what
is shared by all, as a city insists upon its law.
-Heraclitus
75
It was not as if the truth lay where he thought,
Like a phantom, in an uncreated night.
It was easier to think it lay there. If
It was nowhere else, it was there and because
It was nowhere else, its place had to be supposed,
Itself had to be supposed, a thing supposed
In a place supposed, a thing that he reached
In a place that he reached, by rejecting what he saw
And denying what he heard.
-Wallace Stevens
76
necessary to resolve legal disputes, id at 1485, a deduction with which I do not quibble. They
reach this conclusion because they believe that the task of identifying "good" arguments is
non-algorithmic. Id. at 1482. This thesis too is unremarkable, and I share it, but Brown and
Greenberg embrace it without rejecting the truth of strong artificial intelligence (AI). See id.
at 1460-62 (pretermitting conclusion as to tenability of strong AI). Strong AI holds that all
mental processes and attributes consist of complicated algorithms and, if not for the practical
difficulties of doing so, could be exactly reproduced by a computer program. See PENROSE,
supra note 30, at 17-18. If the proponents of strong Al are correct, which I doubt, then the
question of deciding which argument is "good" is indeed algorithmic. See, eg., DANIEL C.
DENNETr, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED (1991); Cf. SEARLE, supra note 42, at 43-57 (arguing
that the failings of strong Al and other attempts to define human cognition as a physical phe-
nomenon result from their refusal to acknowledge that "consciousness" and "intelligence"
have "an ineliminable subjective ontology").
74. LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 413 (3d ed.
1972).
75. Heraclitus, DK 72, 2, 114, quoted in MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF
GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 235 (1986) (Greek
vocabulary omitted).
76. Wallace Stevens, Landscape With Boat, in PARTS OF A WORLD, reprinted in THE
COLLECTED POEMS, 241-42 (1982).
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Several years ago, Laurence Tribe acknowledged in a tantalizingly
titled essay 77 that in order to understand law we must look beyond law-
we must scavenge. But he cautioned legal theorists against "search[ing]
the sciences for authoritative answers to legal questions. ' 78 When consti-
tutional theorists begin to rely on Kurt G6del, they have failed to heed
Professor Tribe's warning. It is time to take stock of what we are doing.
It is time to stop. This admonition has been offered before. Ken Kress
has devised a nice locution: Certain mathematical truths, he says, do not
"go through" into legal English. 79 Mathematics does not "go through"
into law because law is not science.
Neither Tribe nor Kress, however, has inveighed us to cease our
scavenging, for scavenging is not the problem. Scavenging from the
wrong places is. Legal theory must scavenge from only those disciplines
that are fundamentally like our own: those that deal, in Professor
Abrams's language, with questions of "human understanding. '80 Or, as
Professor Tribe has said, "Interdisciplinary comparison brings greater
awareness of preconceptions, and it is the unearthing of such tacit knowl-
edge that often creates the possibility of choice and intellectual pro-
gress."' 81 G6del's proof simply does not meet this test.
The fact that G6del's proof lacks utility for law does not mean that
the descriptive conclusions reached by the formal indeterminists lack
value. Indeed, the contrary is true. For instance, Rogers and Molzon
observe that
systems or bodies of law are inherently incomplete in the sense that
they contain rules of law that cannot be derived within the system....
It follows that constitutional systems are by nature incomplete in the
sense that some law is not derivable through the rules that make up the
constitutional system .... [T]his is a characteristic of constitutional
systems, and indeed of legal systems in general, and ... it therefore
serves as no basis for criticism of any particular constitutional
system. 82
77. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn
from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1989).
78. Id. at 2.
79. Kress, supra note 7, at 144. The immediate object of Professor Kress's argument was
Anthony D'Amato, who has argued for the applicability to law of not only G6del's proof, but
also the L6wenheim-Skolem Theorems. D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, supra note 6, at
175-76 & nn.91-92; D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain?, supra note 6, at 597 n.96.
The Lidwenheim-Skolem Theorems establish that first-order formal systems (defined as
those in which the variables of the language can only represent individual objects (as opposed
to properties or sets of objects)) having one model must also have an additional model in the
space of countable integers. Brown & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 1484 n.202, 1485 n.205.
80. See supra text accompanying note 2.
81. Tribe, supra note 77, at 3.
82. Rogers & Molzon, supra note 6, at 1016.
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This descriptive conclusion, which Brown and Greenberg share, is cor-
rect, of course, but it is also obvious. The more important point, which
Brown and Greenberg do not acknowledge, is that the central problem of
constitutional and legal theory is ultimately unrelated to incompleteness.
Law is indeterminate for conceptual reasons, not because language can-
not be formalized and not because of G6del's insight. This conceptual
indeterminacy is what creates legal theory's most enduring problem:
providing a normative defense not for the institution of judicial review
but instead for a particular method of judicial review.
83
In answering this normative question, it may behoove us to turn
away from Gbdel and toward another great mathematician, Alan Tur-
ing, whom Gidel held in high regard. In commenting on the significance
of Gddel's Theorem to his own work in artificial intelligence, Turing ob-
served that "if a machine is expected to be infallible, it can not also be
intelligent."' 84 What we mean by "intelligent" is something that is not, or
at most only partly, mathematical. 85 Intelligence requires the ability to
live with inconsistency, to cabin off contradiction and utilize the rest of
the system. Describing Wittgenstein's reaction to Gi5del, A.J. Ayer
remarked:
Mathematicians seek to prove the consistency of their systems, because
they want them to be guaranteed against contradiction. And the rea-
son why they attach so much importance to avoiding contradiction, is
not just that a contradiction is bound to be false but that any proposi-
tion whatsoever is derivable from it. Consequently, it threatens the
utility of the system as a whole. But do we have to take this threat so
seriously? Why should we not put the contradiction, or the proposi-
tions from which it follows, as it were in quarantine? If we can sepa-
rate them from the main body of the system, and we find that we can
make a profitable use of what is left, why should we be debarred from
doing so? It is not as if the possibility of constructing the paradox of
the liar in English vitiated the whole language. If this is Wittgenstein's
83. For an innovative philosophical approach to these questions that grounds a defense of
noninterpretivism in democratic political theory, see Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning,
Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (Winter 1992).
84. ANDREW HODGES, ALAN TURING: THE ENIGMA 361 (1983).
85. See LUDWIG WrIrGENsTEIN, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS
53 (1956) (commenting on "[t]he superstitious fear and awe of mathematicians in face of con-
tradiction"); see also Paul Bernays, Comments on Ludwig Wittgenstein's Remarks on the
Foundations of Mathematics, in PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS: SELECTED READINGS 522
(Paul Benacerraf & Hilary Putnam eds., 1964) (discussing Wittgenstein's dismissal of the util-
ity of mathematics). See generally WANG, supra note 19, at 63-67. I have argued, following
Wittgenstein, for the acceptance of contradiction in constitutional theory. See Dow, When
Words Mean What We Believe They Say, supra note 18, at 62-66. I have also argued, in a
nonconstitutional context, in favor of normative theory that is clear and rigorous, albeit
nonmathematical. See Dow, Law School Feminist Chic, supra note 59, at 831-59.
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standpoint, I am in sympathy with it. But then I am not a
mathematician.
86
Neither is law mathematics. Law is norms, and normative advances de-
pend largely on nonmathematical intelligence. To be sure, normative
discussion ought to be as perspicuous and as rigorous as mathematics,
but it will never be math or science. Pretending that it will is to step
backwards in time. In utilizing, if not idolizing, Kurt G6del, legal theory
has resurrected Christopher Langdell.
86. AYER, supra note 24, at 66. For a discussion of Wittgenstein's uncharacteristically
naive response to G6del, see S.G. Shanker, Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Significance of
G"del's Theorem, in G6DEL'S THEOREM IN Focus 155, 155-256 (S.G. Shanker ed., 1988). On
Turing's obsession with the practical consequences of contradiction anywhere in the system,
see MONK, supra note 25, at 420-21.
My colleague Seth Chandler has pointed out to me that Brown and Greenberg's discus-
sion of inconsistency does not rule out the possibility that they would agree with my conclu-
sion here. See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 1448.
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